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The Congressional Review Act (CRA) is often cited as a once-obscure law, but 
during the first four-and-a-half months of the 115th Congress, it was used to rescind 
fourteen administrative rules. Under the CRA, agencies are required to submit rules to 
Congress for review and, upon receipt, Congress has sixty legislative days to issue a joint 
resolution disapproving the rule. If the resolution is signed by the President, the rule is 
overturned. The lookback period is extended at the end of a legislative session. Trump’s 
Office of Management and Budget expanded the CRA by interpreting it to apply to any 
agency guidance that had been approved since the law’s inception in 1996 if that 
guidance had not been reviewed by Congress.  
Repealing the CRA would address several problems created by the law including 
its impact on rulemaking efficiency, waste of federal resources created by revoking rules 
that were years in the making, and regulatory uncertainty. Most importantly, it would 
take away a quick and dirty means to strip American citizens of the environmental, health 
and safety, consumer, and workplace protections administrative rules are generally 
designed to provide. Finally, it would avoid the possibility that vetoed rules may not be 
replaced due to the CRA’s prohibition on substantially similar rules. 
The Sunset the CRA and Restore American Protections (SCRAP) Act was 
introduced in 2017 and could be re-introduced by the 117th Congress. The SCRAP Act is 
found to be a sound policy option with no fiscal burden, but it has the potential to create 
political friction both with Republicans who are committed to “Congressional oversight 
of the Administrative State” and Democrats who are eager to use the CRA to unwind 
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Trump-era rules. Democrats can use the CRA through the end of May 2021 and some 
resolutions have already been introduced. Democrats have other options to get rid of 
problematic rules from a prior administration. Ultimately, this analysis recommends the 
administration pursue a new SCRAP Act. 
Advised by: Professor Paul Weinstein Jr. 
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TO:  Shalanda Young, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget 
FROM:  Melissa Barbanell, Congressional Liaison 
RE:  Repeal of the Congressional Review Act 
DATE:  March 30, 2021 
Action-Forcing Event:  
Democratic members of the 117th Congress are considering using the 
Congressional Review Act (CRA) to reverse numerous midnight regulations, passed in the 
waning months of the Trump Administration.1 Senator Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii) has stated 
that Congress must “coordinate very tightly with the Biden Administration.”2 Sources 
have identified over 1,400 rules and 200 significant rules that may be subject to review 
and revocation under the CRA review window.3 Numerous entities are suggesting which 
rules should be the focus of such CRA review.4  
                                                 
1 Juliet Eilperin and Dino Grandoni. “In Trump’s last days, a spree of environmental rollbacks.” The 
Washington Post, January 15, 2021. 
2 Ibid. 
3 George Washington University, Columbian College of Arts & Sciences, Regulatory Studies Center, 
“Congressional Review Act,” accessed January 30, 2021 
https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/congressional-review-act. Sheila McCafferty Harvey, Elizabeth 
Vella Moeller, and Meghan Claire Hammond. The Return of the Congressional Review Act: With limited time 
to act, what regulations will the Biden administration target with the previously obscure CRA?” Pillsbury, 
Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLP. Published January 19, 2021, https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-
insights/congressional-review-act-cra-biden.html  
4 Katelynn Bradley, Reese Goldsmith, Benjamin Saver, and Eric Waeckerlin. “It’s Back: the Congressional 
Review Act and Implications for Recent Environmental Rules.” Published January 26, 2021, 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/it-s-back-the-congressional-review-act-6025899/. Robert Mangas, and 




Statement of the Problem  
Developing regulations is critical to addressing the problems we face as a 
country; it is a long multi-step process and the CRA provides a means to quickly 
dismantle the important and protective efforts of regulatory agencies with very limited 
deliberation while providing no solutions, offering no guidance to the agency for moving 
forward, and potentially foreclosing the possibility of replacing the regulations being 
disapproved.5  
In brief, the CRA provides for disapproval of final agency rules within 60 days of 
continuous session after the rule has been submitted to Congress. It establishes a look-
back period in the event that Congress adjourns prior to the running of 60 session days.6 
The CRA provides that multiple rules cannot be bundled under a single disapproval 
resolution, that a rule may only be disapproved in its entirety, and that such a rule “may 
not be reissued in substantially the same form.”7 Under, the CRA, “major rules” (i.e., those 
with a $100 million effect on the economy) take effect on the latest of 60 days after the 
date the rule is published in the Federal Register or received by Congress.8  
                                                 
https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2021/1/will-the-new-congress-reverse-any-midnight-rules. Cydney 
Posner. “Will the new Congress use the Congressional Review Act to nullify recent rulemakings?” Cooley  
LLC. Published January 13, 2021, https://cooleypubco.com/2021/01/13/new-congress-congressional-review-
act/  
5 Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-805 (1996). Associate General Contractors of 
America, EPA’s Rulemaking Process, (“Federal regulations often take years to complete . . .”), accessed 
February 13, 2021 
https://www.agc.org/sites/default/files/Galleries/enviro_members_file/EPA%20Rulemaking%20Process%20Ha
ndout.pdf. 
6 Daniel R. Perez. “Congressional Review Act Fact Sheet,” (Washington, DC: Regulatory Studies Center, The 
George Washington University, 2019.) 
7 Ibid.  
8 Congressional Research Service, “The Congressional Review Act (CRA): Frequently asked Questions” by  




I. AGENCY ACTION THROUGH REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE SERVE A CRITICAL ROLE  
Congress has created a vacuum due to hyper-partisan gridlock; it has failed to 
update laws or develop new laws to address the current issues facing the country.9 
Further, the laws Congress has passed leave gaps for regulatory agencies to fill – either 
due to a desire not to make controversial decisions or due to a lack of technical 
knowledge.10 As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Chevron v. NRDC, “it is entirely 
appropriate for [an agency to resolve] the competing interests which Congress itself 
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency.”11  
Into this breach, agencies have been forced to leap. Given that the issues of the 
day must be addressed, executive agencies have acted by passing regulations and 
providing guidance. The current complete dysfunction in Congress has made it all the 
more important for agencies to act: 
in our current age of hyper-partisanship, few members [of Congress] care 
much for protecting the legislature’s institutional prerogatives, and as a 
result it has become almost the expected norm for the executive branch 
to make the first move in addressing pressing problems through legally-
strained interpretations of existing statutes rather than looking to any 
kind of iterated legislative process.12 
                                                 
9 Jody Freeman and David B. Spence. “Old Statutes, New Problems.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
162 (December 2014), 1-93. 
10 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Philip Wallach, “The administrative state’s legitimacy crisis,” (Washington, DC: Center for Effective Public 
Management at Brookings, 2016) 10, accessed April 30, 2021 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Administrative-state-legitimacy-crisis_FINAL.pdf. See also, Matthew Oakes, Donald 
Verrilli, Richard Pierce, and Jody Freeman, “The Future of Administrative Law” Environmental Law Reporter 47 
(March 2017), 10186 (“Congress does nothing and, as a result, the executive branch, feeling pressure to try to 
address the problems that confront the country, looks to existing statutory authority and tries to find ways, 
sometimes through creative readings of statutory authority, to identify sources of power to deal with the 
serious problems confronting the country. . . . It would be a lot better if Congress actually played the role it's 
supposed to play in our constitutional system. But given that it's not, it's unrealistic to think that an executive 
branch is going to sit on its hands rather than try to confront the problems of the country.”) 
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Climate change is emblematic of Congress’ failure to create new laws to address 
current problems. The Clean Air Act was reauthorized in 1990, long before the looming 
climate crisis was clear to American policymakers. The statute was not designed to 
address pollutants like carbon dioxide where the harm comes not from a single source 
but rather from the agglomeration of all of the sources across the globe. Nonetheless, in 
the absence of Congress passing appropriate laws that would put a price on carbon and 
thereby limit carbon emissions, executive agencies shoe-horned climate regulations into 
the Clean Air Act via regulation.13  
II. SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES ARE EXPENDED TO DEVELOP REGULATIONS UNDER AUTHORIZING 
STATUTES AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS WHEREAS RELATIVELY FEW RESOURCES ARE 
EXPENDED TO DISAPPROVE REGULATIONS UNDER CRA 
Significant time is committed to the development or regulations. Some examples 
of just how long the process can take include two of the “midnight” rules overturned 
using the CRA during the 115th Congress.14 The Stream Protection Rule updated thirty-
three-year-old regulations and was designed to prevent or minimize impacts to surface 
and ground water from coal mining. The development process began in 2009 and the 
                                                 
13 David Doniger. “The Clean Air Act and Climate Change: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,” (New 
York: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2014) (“in the second term, with a different Congress and no 
prospect of helpful legislation, President Obama stepped up to the challenge of tackling climate change 
under the clean air and energy laws already on the books. . . . The heart of the plan is using the Clean Air Act 
to put the first-ever national limits on carbon pollution from the fleet of existing power plants.) 
14 Thomas O. McGarity, Rena Steinzor, James Goodwin, and Katherine Tracy. “The Congressional Review Act: 
The Case for Repeal,” (Washington, DC: Center for Progressive Reform, 2018) (“On average, the 15 rules that 
were eliminated through the CRA had been in the works for approximately three years each.”). Stuart 
Shapiro. “Why does it take so long to issue a regulation?” The Hill, May 19, 2015 (citing cases of rulemakings 
taking upwards of 5-10 years while recognizing that thousands of non-controversial often take under a year 




rule was finalized in December of 2016.15 Similarly, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) anti-corruption rule efforts began pursuant to a statute passed in 
2010. The purpose of this rule was to increase the transparency of payments made by 
extractive industries in support of U.S. foreign policy interests. These regulations went 
through the regular process of notice-and-comment rulemaking and resulted in a rule 
which was finalized in 2012. This initial rule was vacated by the D.C. District Court in 
2013.16 The SEC went back to the drawing board to develop a rule that would comply 
with the requirements established by the court, and in September of 2016 finalized a 
revised final rule.17 
Proponents of the CRA believe that its fast-track mechanisms are good policy. 
The resolutions may “short-circuit the congressional committee process.”18 CRA 
disapproval resolutions are not subject to the Senate filibuster, provide a means to force 
the resolution from committee after twenty days if thirty Senators petition, allow any 
Senator to make a non-debatable motion to proceed, disallow amendments and limit 
floor debate to ten hours.19 “Similar expedited procedures were not enacted in the 
House of Representatives, although House committees may still be circumvented.”20  
                                                 
15 U.S. Department of Interior, “Press Release: Interior Department Finalizes Stream Protection Rule to 
Safeguard Communities from Coal Mining Impacts,” 2016, https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-
department-finalizes-stream-protection-rule-safeguard-communities-coal-mining.  
16 API v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 8 (2013).  
17 Securities and Exchange Commission, “17 CFR Parts 240 and 240b, Disclosure of Payments by Resource 
Extraction Issuers, Final rule. 2016,” accessed February 15, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-
78167.pdf.  
18 “The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act.” Harvard Law Review, 122. (June 2009), 2162, 2183. 
19 Daniel R. Perez, “Congressional Review Act Fact Sheet.”  
20 “The Mysteries of the CRA.” at 2168. 
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These fast-track provisions do allow Congress to act quickly. Whether this is good 
policy is debatable. This often means that a rule that has been authorized pursuant to a 
statute passed in the ordinary fashion (i.e., subject to filibuster, etc.) and which may have 
taken years in development can be overturned in a matter of weeks and without 
significant deliberation. The 115th Congress, in issuing its CRA disapprovals showed 
“scant concern for the policy merits” of their disapprovals; in fact, the Senators speaking 
in favor of resolutions frequently ceded back their time despite the CRA’s limitation of 
Senate floor debate to ten hours.21   
III. REGULATIONS PROVIDE PROTECTION TO MEMBERS OF SOCIETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
BY REMOVING THOSE PROTECTIONS THE CRA ENDANGERS AMERICANS. 
Broadly speaking, agency rules provide safeguards and protect people and the 
environment.22 The CRA creates a means to remove these protections. One needs only 
look at the rules that have been overturned with the CRA to see that these regulations 
were protective of American citizens and our environment. The use of the CRA to 
overturn these regulations harms those that would otherwise be protected.  
Figure 1. Rules Rescinded Using the CRA 
Rules Rescinded Using the CRA  
Rule Year CRA 
Disapproval 
Issued 
Safeguards associated with regulation23 
Dept of Labor 
Ergonomics Rule  
2001 Protected workers from musculoskeletal disorders 
associated with repetitive motion tasks in the 
workplace.  
                                                 
21 McGarity et al. “The CRA: The Case for Repeal.”  
22 It is important to recognize, however, that the rules proposed for CRA evaluation by the 117th Congress 
were largely anti-safeguard. Nonetheless, the vast majority of rules that are subject to the CRA are 
protective.   
23 Thomas O. McGarity, “The Congressional Review Act: A Damage Assessment.” The American Prospect, 
Winter 2018.  
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Dept of Labor 
Injury 
Recordkeeping 
2017 Protected worker safety by creating recordkeeping 
scheme that allowed OSHA to prosecute 
recordkeeping failures even if identified six months 
post-violation. 
Dept of Labor 
Drug Testing 
2017 Protected public safety by listing occupations for 
which drug test was allowed consistent with court 
opinions, e.g., aerospace, trucking, and law 
enforcement.  





2017 Supported state regulations that created programs 
which automatically enroll employees in “auto-IRA” 
plans, DOL committed to not pre-empt such 




2017 Protected workers by incentivizing improved labor 
law performance by prospective contractors; made 
information on bidders’ violations of labor law 





2017 Protected investors from impacts of corruption by 
ensuring that extractive industries operating 





2017 Protected the public by requiring SSA staff to 
submit information to National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System on recipients who could 





2017 Protected internet users by requiring internet 
service providers to provide “reasonable security 
data” to prevent hacking and by requiring user 




to Family Planning 
Healthcare 
Services 
2017 Protected low-income women who use health care 
services of Planned Parenthood by preventing 
states from considering whether recipient 
organization performed abortions in distribution of 
Title X funds. Title X funds can’t be used for 
abortions; providers perform other potentially life-
saving tests.   
Dept of Education 
State 
Accountability  
2017 Protected students by requiring DOE to 
promulgate timelines for ensuring that state 
accountability plans be equitable and address the 
needs of low-income and minority students.  
                                                 
24 Agencies included: Department of Defense, General Services Administration and National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration. See Maeve P. Carey, “The CRA: FAQs,” at 25.  
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Dept of Education 
Teacher 
Preparation 
2017 Protected students by improving the quality of 
teacher preparation programs at schools receiving 
federal grants.  
Dept of Interior 
Stream Protection 
2017 Protected community water users and biodiversity 
by requiring surface coal mining operations to 
monitor streams and groundwater before and 
during operations, requiring overburden to be 100 
feet from streams, and requiring mine reclamation.  
Dept of Interior 
Land Use Planning 
2017 Protected biodiversity by requiring land-use plans 
to be completed at landscape level and provided 
for public input in land use plan development.  
Dept of Interior 
Alaska Predator 
Protection 
2017 Protected biodiversity and ecosystems more 
broadly in Alaska National Wildlife Refuge by 
disallowing unsportsmanlike killing of predators. 
Intended to maintain sustainable populations of 





2017 Protected citizens’ right to jury trial by prohibiting 
financial services companies from using forced 
arbitration clauses and allowed customers to bring 
class-action lawsuits against financial institutions.  
CFPB Indirect 




2018 Protected minorities by requiring that indirect auto 
lenders ensure compliance with anti-discrimination 
principles of Equal Credit Opportunity Act.   
IV. BECAUSE THE CRA ONLY ALLOWS FOR GENERIC DISAPPROVAL AND NO NEW RULES THAT ARE 
SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME, AGENCIES MAY FACE SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES DEVELOPING 
REGULATIONS TO ADDRESS THE MOST PRESSING ISSUES. 
The CRA is a blunt instrument which “can be used only to invalidate an agency 
final rule in its entirety. It cannot be used to modify or restructure a rule in order to make 
it acceptable to Congress.”25 The statute specifies the precise language that Congress 
must use in a disapproval resolution: “The Congress disapproves the rule submitted by 
the ____ relating to ___ and such rule shall have no force or effect.”26 There is no 
                                                 
25 Congressional Research Service, “The CRA: FAQs,” at 5.  
26 5 U.S.C. § 802(a).  
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opportunity to expand on this language or provide additional guidance as to the specific 
offending portion of the rule.   
Coupled with the lack of specificity available under the CRA, the fact that CRA 
disapproval resolutions do more than simply unwind the targeted regulations but also 
may bind future agency action is perhaps the most damning feature of the law. The CRA 
provides that an agency may not reissue the rule in “substantially the same form” or 
issue a “new rule that is substantially the same” as the disapproved rule “unless the 
reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint 
resolution disapproving the original rule.”27  
The meaning of the “substantially the same form” language has not been 
examined by the courts and, what’s worse, judicial review is potentially foreclosed by the 
statute itself. The uncertainty related to the prohibition of “substantially similar” rules is 
exacerbated by the CRA provision stating that “[n]o determination, finding, action, or 
omissions under this chapter shall be subject to judicial review.”28 Courts have generally 
interpreted this language to mean that they cannot consider any claims that an agency 
has failed to comply with the CRA.29 However, various legal scholars have argued that 
                                                 
27 Congressional Research Service, “The CRA: FAQs,” at 17 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 801(f)). 
28 5 U.S.C. § 805. 
29 Congressional Research Service, “The CRA: FAQs,” at 1. See also, Michael J. Cole “Interpreting the 
Congressional Review Act: Why the Courts Should Assert Judicial Review, Narrowly Construct ‘Substantially 





courts should review whether an new rule developed by an agency runs afoul of the 
“substantially the same” provision of the CRA.30  
The possibility that agencies are forever barred from issuing regulations on the 
same subject matter as the disapproved rules may significantly limit the ability of any 
entity to address pressing issues of the day. As described above, Congress seems 
singularly unable to develop new legislation to address pressing matters and oftentimes, 
the only viable option is for executive agencies to jump into the fray. It is important, 
however, to note that the “substantially the same form” language was intentional. As the 
co-sponsors of the CRA stated in a post-enactment joint statement, this provision “gives 
the CRA teeth: without the provision, agencies could easily circumvent resolutions of 
disapproval.”31 
V. DISAPPROVALS UNDER THE CRA HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO CREATE REGULATORY 
UNCERTAINTY. 
The CRA has the potential to create regulatory uncertainty for regulated 
industries. The CRA applies to all final rules. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, 
agencies must establish an effective date thirty days after the rule becomes final.32 Only 
major rules are prevented from entering into force until sixty days after publication in the 
Federal Register or when a report is made to Congress.33 In the case of a non-major rule 
                                                 
30 Cole, “Interpreting the CRA: Why Courts Should Assert Judicial Review,” at 68. Adam M. Finkel and Jason 
W. Sullivan “A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of the ‘Substantially Similar’ Hurdle in the Congressional Review 
Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?” Administrative Law Review 63 (Fall 2011), 707-
784. C 
31 Stephen Stanulli. “Use of the Congressional Review Act at the Start of the Trump Administration: A Study 
of Two Vetoes.” George Washington Law Review 86 (September 2018), 1373-1391 (citing 142 Cong. Rec. 
8199 (1996)).   





that goes final within sixty days of the adjournment of a session of Congress, there could 
be a delay of six to eight months between when the rule goes final and when Congress 
passes a disapproval resolution given the lookback period provided for in the CRA.34  
In practice, there could be a long delay between a non-major rule going final and 
Congress disapproving that rule. For example, the Congressional Research Service has 
preliminarily found that rules that were finalized before August 21, 2020 may be subject 
to review under the CRA.35 The 117th Congress has until April 2, 2021 to introduce CRA 
resolutions of disapproval.36 This would leave over an eight-month window where rules 
could have been finalized yet still be considered for rescission under the CRA.  
If a final rule is applicable one month after it is finalized, regulated industries 
might have been required to comply with the rule up to nine months prior to it being 
disapproved by Congress. Compliance with federal rules can often be costly (even if 
these rules are not major, meaning they do not meet the $100 million annual effect on 
the economy requirement).37 If a company has brought itself into compliance with a new 
rule, the costs are sunk, and rescission is not in anyone’s best interest. 
The situation is exacerbated by the 2019 OMB memorandum which calls into 
question the effectiveness of many guidance documents extending all the way back to 
                                                 
34 Jace Lington, “COVID-19 might allow the 117th Congress to block more Trump administration regulations,” 
Ballotopedia News, (May 23, 2020), accessed February 18, 2021 
https://news.ballotpedia.org/2020/05/23/covid-19-might-allow-117th-congress-to-block-more-trump-
administration-regulations. See also, George Washington University, Congressional Review Act.   
35 Congressional Research Service, “Congressional Review Act Issues for the 117th Congress: The Lookback 
Mechanism and Effects of Disapproval” by Maeve P. Carey and Christopher M. Davis (February 19, 2021), 6. 
36 Kelsey Brugger, “Dems weigh assault on Trump rules, but time is short.” E&E News, March 17, 2021, 
accessed March 20, 2021 https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063727671.  




1996. If, under the CRA, these were deemed to have no effect, an enormous number of 
resources would have already been spent complying with these now-invalid 
requirements.38 Companies will have implemented new policies, procedures, and 
installed new pollution control devices that may turn out to be unnecessary should a 
regulation or guidance be deemed ineffective under CRA.39  
History/Background 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE CRA  
The CRA was passed in March of 1996 as part of the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) section of the Contract with America Advancement 
Act of 1996. It amended the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Republican 
proponents of the Contract with America claimed that its reforms “would be the end of 
government that is too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the public's money.”40 The 
underlying sentiment of the need to shrink government and particularly the role of 
regulatory agencies, is alive and well today, twenty-five years later.  
The CRA was passed on a bipartisan basis and was signed into law by a 
Democratic President – Bill Clinton.41 Recognizing that Congress had delegated more 
                                                 
38 Paul Larkin. “OMB’s new Approach to Agency Guidance Documents.” The Regulatory Review, Penn 
Program on Regulation (June 10, 2019). 
39 Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, General Counsel, U.S. Government Accountability Office to Hon. Patrick 
J. Toomey (December 5, 2017), accessed February 13, 2021 https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688763.pdf.  
40 Republican Contract with America, accessed February 16, 2021 
https://web.archive.org/web/19990427174200/http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html.  
41 Bethany A. Davis Noll and Richard Revesz. “Regulation in Transition.” Minnesota Law Review 104 
(November 2019), 1-100. (highlighting that prior to the CRA, Congress had used a uni- or bi-cameral 
legislative veto to disapprove of agency rules. However, in 1983, in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. 
Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court held that these practices circumvented the Constitution’s bicameralism and 




and more of its legislative functions to federal regulatory agencies, the CRA was an effort 
to “redress the balance, reclaiming for Congress some of its policymaking authority, 
without at the same time requiring Congress to become a super regulatory agency.”42 
Congress’ objective was to provide oversight to agencies and to take responsibility for 
those regulations that withstood CRA review.43 The CRA was deemed necessary because 
Congress believed that regulatory agencies sometimes developed rules that are at odds 
with congressional and public expectations.44  
The CRA should be understood within the context of twentieth-century thinking 
about the role of regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies have been under scrutiny 
constantly and consistently since they burgeoned as part of the New Deal. And efforts at 
“regulatory reform” have been ongoing since that time.  
A significant segment of society still shares many of the concerns Congress 
expressed in 1996 regarding the administrative state and the regulatory agencies that 
comprise it. For instance, in 2016, the role of regulatory bodies was described as: 
“successive cycles of ‘new’ policy initiatives [that] have left behind an institutional residue 
that is now layered so thick as to be opaque to ordinary citizens’ powers of inspection. 
Government is a sprawling, impenetrable edifice that is encountered with frustration . . . 
                                                 
42 42 Cong. Rec. E575 (1996). 
43 Ibid., at E578 (“Congress is enacting the congressional review chapter, in large part, as an exercise of its 
oversight and legislative responsibilities.”). The proponents of the CRA stated that it was necessary in part to 
make sure there is accountability for regulatory action; however, the Supreme Court stated, in 2019, in Kisor 
v. Wilkie, that “agencies . . . have political accountability, because they are subject to the supervision of the 
President, who in turn answers to the public.” Kisor v. Wilkie 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2143 (2019). 




.”45 The magnitude of regulatory activity can be astounding: “[t]he Federal Register alone 
comprises some 70,000 pages annually. Any attempt at congressional oversight of these 
bureaucracies is impossible; the sheer size of the Administrative State is . . . 
incomprehensible.”46 In 2017, the administrative state was described in Forbes magazine 
as: 220,000 federal regulators working with a regulatory budget of about $63 billion who 
write and enforce . . . rules that cost the economy approximately $1.9 trillion annually.47 
II. WHILE THE CRA WAS USED SUCCESSFULLY ONLY ONCE PRIOR TO 2017, INTEREST HAS 
GROWN 
Despite the fact that the CRA has been on the books since 1996, it was only used 
once before 2017. Because the CRA requires a majority vote in both houses of Congress 
and a signature by the President, it is most useful at times when there is a transition of 
power from a President of one party to a President of the other party and when 
Congress is in the hands of the incoming President’s party. Otherwise, a President is very 
likely to veto any disapproval resolutions that arrive on his desk.48  
In 2001, when the Bush Administration came into office and Republicans took 
control of Congress, Republicans in Congress led the effort to strike a rule promulgated 
by OSHA during the Clinton Administration. OSHA had been working on a version of the 
                                                 
45 Philip Wallach, “The administrative state’s legitimacy crisis,” at 4. 
46 Donald S. Dobkin, “The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for Lawlessness,” Kansas Journal of 
Law & Public Policy 17, no. 3 (Spring 2008), 362, 363. 
47 Chuck Devore, “The Administrative State is Under Assault and That’s a Good Thing,” Forbes (November 27, 
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2017/11/27/the-administrative-state-is-under-assault-
and-thats-a-good-thing/#2e7a01bb393c 
48 Robert V. Percival. “Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive,” 
Duke Law Journal 5 (2001), 963, at 1002 (“Because the president can veto resolutions disapproving rules 
under the CRA, it is unlikely to be used frequently. . . except in circumstances where a new President seeks to 




ergonomics rule for a decade, but it was characterized by the 107th Congress as a 
“midnight” regulation.49  The joint resolution of disapproval was passed in March of 2001 
and signed into law by President Bush.  
In the twenty years since the ergonomics rule was rescinded, OSHA has not 
attempted to issue a new rule to replace it. This is undoubtedly due to the prohibition on 
substantially similar rules. Any agency considering developing a replacement rule faces 
the threat of invalidation as the rule may be deemed substantially similar. In fact, all 
agencies “may be deterred from promulgating regulations within a certain area for fear 
of having its work nullified—or worse, of having ruined for posterity the ability to 
regulate in a given area.”50  
In the time between the OSHA ergonomics rule recission in 2001 and the 
beginning of the 115th Congress in 2017, no CRA joint resolution of disapproval made it 
through Congress. However, in the period between 2001 and 2009, thirty-nine CRA 
resolutions were introduced.51 Some of these proposed CRA disapproval resolutions 
were sponsored by Democrats objecting rules passed by Bush-Administration agencies 
including one that would have had a negative impact on air quality. Had any of these 
resolutions passed both houses of Congress, President Bush would have likely vetoed 
them. 
In 2009, When President Obama took office and the Democrats took control of 
Congress, the scene was set for the use of the CRA to overturn Bush Administration 
                                                 
49 Finkel and Sullivan. “A Cost-Benefit Interpretation,” at 726.  
50 Ibid. at 730.  
51 Sam Batkins. “Congress Strikes Back: The Institutionalization of the Congressional Review Act.” Mitchell 
Hamline Law Review 45:2 (2019), 351-392, 366.  
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rules. Indeed, Congressional Democrats considered using the CRA to repeal the Bush 
Administration’s midnight rules, but the Obama administration opted to use other tools 
available to it rather than run the risks associated with a CRA veto.52 After Obama took 
office and, in the lead-up to the midterm elections – the 112th Congress (2011-12) – 
Republicans introduced a record-setting twenty-five CRA resolutions.53  
III. SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT OF THE CRA SKYROCKETED UNDER TRUMP AND DEMOCRATS 
WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN ATTEMPTS AT A REPEAL OF THE CRA. 
In 2017, when President Trump took office and Republicans took control of 
Congress, the Administration used every tool at its disposal to unwind Obama-era 
regulatory actions.54 This included what some have characterized as reckless use of the 
CRA.55 Shortly after the election, the Congressional Research Service issued a 
memorandum concluding that the look-back period under the CRA extended to May 30, 
2016 and that nearly fifty major rules qualified for consideration under the CRA.56 In the 
first four and a half months of the 115th Congress, fourteen joint resolutions of 
disapproval were passed.57 All told, in 2017 and 2018, the CRA was used to rescind 
sixteen rules and a total of seventy-three resolutions were introduced.58   
                                                 
52 Finkel and Sullivan. “A Cost-Benefit Interpretation,” at 729. 
53 Batkins. “Congress Strikes Back,” at 369. 
54 Noll and Revesz “Regulation in Transition,” at 2-3 (“he also made aggressive use of several relatively low-
profile tools – disapprovals under the Congressional Review Act, abeyances in pending litigation, and 
suspensions of final regulations . . . .”) 
55 McGarity et al. “The CRA: The Case for Repeal,” at 2. (“Over the course of 2017, anti-safeguard members of 
Congress, with President Donald Trump riding shotgun, took the CRA for a reckless test drive, confirming 
just how dangerous the law is, especially when in the wrong hands.”). 
56 Stanulli. “Use of the CRA at the Start of the Trump Administration,” at 1381 (citing Congressional Research 
Service, “Major” Obama Administrations Rules Potentially Eligible to Be Overturned under the Congressional 
Review Act in the 115th Congress, by Maeve P. Carey (2016), 2).  
57 Ibid.  




In May of 2017, just after the window closed to apply the CRA to Obama-era 
rules, the Sunset the CRA and Restore American Protections (SCRAP) Act of 2017 was 
introduced by Cory Booker in the Senate and a companion bill was introduced by David 
Cicilline in the House.59 The bill would have repealed the CRA in its entirety and removed 
the prohibition on agencies reissuing a previously overturned rule, and it would have 
given agencies greater flexibility in reinstating such rules.60 This bill was supported by 
various progressive groups. Those who favored the bill argued that the use of the CRA 
during the 115th Congress  
was an unmitigated disaster for those who believe in Internet privacy, gun 
control, protecting the environment and clean water, women’s health, 
workplace safety, fair pay measures, and retirement security. But for a 
handful of big corporations that spent more than $1 billion lobbying to 
get their way, it was Congress’s finest moment.61  
Others who supported a repeal argued that “[b]y unwinding the significant public 
health, safety, environmental or financial protections these safeguards would otherwise 
have delivered, each CRA resolution that is adopted boils down to a direct assault on the 
public interest.”62 As predicted, the SCRAP Act did not pass through either house of the 
Republican-controlled Congress and died. No further efforts to repeal the CRA have 
since been proposed.  
 
                                                 
59 Congress.gov “S.1140 – SCRAP Act”, 115th Congress, accessed February 16, 2021 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1140. Congress.gov “H.R. 2449 – SCRAP Act,” 115th 
Congress, accessed February 16, 2021 https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2449/text.  
60 “Ciciline, Booker Introduce Bill to Repeal Congressional Review Act.” Congressman David Cicilline, Media 
Center, accessed February 16, 2021 https://cicilline.house.gov/press-release/cicilline-booker-introduce-bill-
repeal-congressional-review-act.  
61 Lisa Gilbert and Amit Narang. “Scrap the Congressional Review Act.” The Regulatory Review, Penn Program 
on Regulation (June 7, 2017).  
62 McGarity et al. “The CRA: The Case for Repeal.”  
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IV. DURING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION, THE CRA WAS EXPANDED TO APPLY BEYOND 
MIDNIGHT RULES. 
Shortly after the SCRAP Act failed, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
responded to an inquiry from Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA) regarding a final interagency 
guidance document which was issued in 2013. The GAO found that the interagency 
guidance “is a general statement of policy and is a rule under the CRA.”63 In light of the 
GAO letter, a resolution of disapproval regarding the 2013 guidance was introduced in 
the Senate in March of 2018, it passed both houses of Congress, and was signed into law 
within two months.64   
After the 115th Congress rescinded this five-year-old guidance, the Office of 
Management and Budget issued a memorandum, superseding a memorandum issued in 
1999, interpreting the CRA’s reporting requirements for federal agencies and adopting 
an expansive interpretation of what constitutes a “rule” under the CRA.65 The OMB 
guidance has been interpreted to extend the meaning of a rule for purposes of the CRA 
to include many different types of guidance including regulatory guidance letters, Dear 
Colleague letters, bulletins, advisory circulars, etc.66 “Agencies have issued thousands of 
guidance documents. . . , but have submitted only a fraction of . . . them to Congress.”67 
Under the OMB memorandum, all of those could potentially be subject to CRA review.  
                                                 
63 Letter from Susan Poling, General Counsel Government Accountability Office to Senator Pat Toomey 
(October 19, 2017), accessed February 16, 2021 https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687879.pdf.  
64 Batkins. “Congress Strikes Back,” at 385. 
65 Russel T. Vought, Office of Management and Budget, “Guidance on Compliance with the Congressional 
Review Act.” (April 11, 2019), accessed February 16, 2021 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/M-19-14.pdf.  
66 Larkin. “OMB’s new Approach to Agency Guidance Documents.” 
67 Ibid.  
19 
 
The Brookings Institution attempted to provide a “more realistic” analysis of how 
many additional “rules” could be subject to CRA review based on the 2018 recission. This 
analysis supports a narrower interpretation of the 2019 OMB memorandum as well. 
Brookings’ analysis found that between 1996 and 2016, there were “348 significant rules 
with apparent reporting deficiencies to one or more of the GAO, House, and Senate, out 
of a total of 3,197 significant rules.”68 The analysis concludes that probably most of the 
identified rules are “unlikely to engender much controversy. . . . [b]ut there are a good 
number that probably are quite controversial.”69  
V. LIVE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CRA. 
At present, the CRA is fully functional; there are two major unknowns about its 
application which could create significant problems should the law remain in place. 
Despite the CRA becoming law in 1996, it has not been tested because it was not applied 
in earnest until 2017.  
One of the most potentially consequential of these unknowns is how the 
prohibition on “substantially similar” rules will play out. The questions include: (1) When 
a regulation which was adopted pursuant to a statutory requirement and has been 
rescinded pursuant to the CRA, can the agency reissue the rule absent Congress passing 
new authorizing legislation permitting it to do so?70 (2) Are agencies disallowed from 
reissuing regulations that cover the same substantive area of law, and if they are 
                                                 
68 Philip A. Wallach and Nicholas W. Zeppos. “How powerful is the Congressional Review Act?” (Washington, 
DC: Brookings, 2017), accessed April 30, 2021 https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-powerful-is-the-
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permitted, will they follow OSHA’s model and opt not to expend resources developing a 
new regulation given the possibility that the replacement rule will be rejected because it 
is not substantially different?71 (3) If an agency reissues a rule, who has the power to 
determine if it is substantially the same – the agency, the courts or Congress? (4) Do the 
courts have the authority to evaluate a new rule to determine if it is substantially 
different or substantially the same?72 (5) If courts were to determine that they have the 
authority to review replacement rules to determine if they are substantially different, 
would they apply the arbitrary and capricious standard or grant the agency deference 
under Chevron and its progeny.73 
The other set of unknowns associated with the CRA is the scope of its application. 
The 2019 OMB Memorandum expanded the interpretation of what constitutes a “rule” 
under the CRA from the earlier 1999 OMB memorandum which was silent on guidance 
documents. OMB stated that “the CRA adopts the [APA’s] expansive definition of ‘rule,’ 
which includes, subject to certain exceptions, ‘the whole or a part of an agency statement 
of general . . . applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or 
prescribe law or policy . . . .”74 This has been interpreted to mean that the CRA applies to 
                                                 
71 Finkel and Sullivan “A Cost-Benefit Interpretation,” at 730 (quoting Statement of Elaine L. Chao, Secretary, 
U.S. Department of Labor: “she did not want to ‘expend valuable—and limited—resources on a new effort’ if 
another regulation would be invalidated as substantially similar.”) 
72 There is a range of views on whether this issue is precluded by the CRA’s prohibition on judicial review of 
any “determination, finding, action, or omissions under this chapter.” 5 U.S.C. § 805. See Congressional 
Research Service, “The CRA: FAQs,” at 18; but see Cole. “Interpreting the CRA,” at 68 and M. Finkel and 
Sullivan. “A Cost-Benefit Interpretation.” 
73 Cole. “Interpreting the CRA,” at 55. 




“every agency memorandum that tells private parties what they must, may, or may not 
do.”75  
The OMB memorandum also addresses the ability of agencies to act without first 
seeking approval from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). It states 
that agencies should not publish any rule anywhere (e.g., the Federal Register, their 
websites, or in any other public manner) until OIRA has made the determination that the 
agency has complied with all CRA requirements – such as sending them to Congress if 
appropriate.76 This has the potential to significantly slow down the issuance of guidance 
documents and may become the subject of litigation.77  
Further, the CRA states that until the CRA requirements of submitting reports to 
Congress has occurred, any rules have no effect. There is an argument that given OMB’s 
2019 pronouncements, that twenty-five years’ worth of rules (that were not submitted to 
Congress) have no effect. Obviously, this would send shock waves through all 
government agencies and the industries regulated by them. This is likely why OMB did 
not go this far in its memorandum, but it is a natural extension of their analysis.78  
VI. CURRENT SENTIMENT REGARDING USE OF THE CRA. 
Despite the risks and challenges associated with deploying the CRA, many 
progressives are changing their tune since the Democrats took Congress and the 
Presidency. Even James Goodwin of the Center for Progressive Reform who argued 
vigorously for repeal of the CRA now recognizes that the CRA “could be put to positive 
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short-term use” to repeal “those [Trump] rollbacks that would reinstate those rules and 
benefits they delivered.” He states, “The CRA offers some utility to supporters of 
regulatory safeguard in the next Congress” while not endorsing its use per se.79 
Democrats are clearly considering using the CRA to reverse what is perceived as Trump’s 
rollbacks of Obama-era midnight rules that relaxed regulations on the environment, on 
oversight of banks, on transparency, and internet service companies.80 As one scholar 
who has written in this area stated: “It's the quickest way to get rid of policies that will 
cause significant harms to the health of Americans and to the quality of our 
environment.”81 
Policy Proposal  
Despite the fact that interest in employing the CRA has been growing among 
members of both parties over the last two decades and the fact that the last Republican-
controlled Congress deployed it successfully to overturn sixteen CRA “rules,” this 
Administration should completely repeal the CRA82 and allow agencies to reissue a 
previously overturned rule. The proposal to seek to repeal CRA should be sought by June 
of 2021 by the 117th Congress. By repealing the CRA in its entirety, executive agencies 
will be reassured of the value of working to develop sound and protective regulations, 
                                                 
79 James Goodwin. “The Congressional Review Act Could be put to Positive Short-Term Use, But it Should 
Still be Repealed,” (Washington, DC: Center for Progressive Reform, 2020). 
80 Sarah Hansen, “Democrats Eye Senate Control – Here’s How They Could Roll Back Trump’s ‘Midnight’ 
Regulations.” Forbes (January 6, 2021). See also, Katelynn Bradley et al. “It’s Back: the Congressional Review 
Act and Implications for Recent Environmental Rules.” Robert Mangas and Barringer. “Will the New Congress 
Reverse Any ‘Midnight Rules?” Posner. “Will the new Congress use the Congressional Review Act to nullify 
recent rulemakings?”  
81 Kelsey Brugger. “Senate Democrats eye quick repeal of Trump rules.” E&E News Reporter (January 6, 2021) 
(quoting Professor Ricky Revesz of New York University).  
82 Chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code.  
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thereby filling the gaps left by current legislation. Repealing the CRA will also prevent the 
waste of resources associated with striking regulations that have been developed over 
the course of years, and it will allow reissuance of rules that have been vetoed through 
the CRA or the issuance of new rules covering the same subject-matter area.  
I. POLICY AUTHORIZATION TOOL 
The only means to accomplish this policy goal would be to propose new 
legislation in the House and Senate to repeal the CRA in its entirety. The legislation 
would be a reintroduction of the Sunset the CRA and Restore American Protections Act 
of 2017 or the SCRAP Act.83 The new bill would not need to amend the SCRAP Act of 
2017; rather it could simply be reintroduced as the SCRAP Act of 2021 during the 117th  
Congress with the objective of passage by June of 2021 – the period during which the 
threat of application of the CRA to revoke Trump-era rules is effective.  
An executive order cannot be used to repeal a statute.84 While the courts could 
find the CRA unconstitutional, that route to challenge the CRA has been attempted and 
has failed. Courts have held that the CRA does not to contain the constitutional 
infirmities that were at issue in INS v. Chadha.85 The CRA addressed the separation-of-
powers issue and the violation of the Take Care clause that were fatal to the statute at 
issue in INS v. Chadha. In Center for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, the U.S. Court of 
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Appeals for the 9th Circuit was evaluating a CRA joint resolution of disapproval. The court 
held that “Congress complied with the process of bicameralism and presentment in 
enacting the Joint Resolution . . . the Joint Resolution . . . did not prevent the President 
from exercising his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.”86 
The SCRAP Act of 2021 bill could be introduced by the same Representatives and 
Senators who introduced the SCRAP Act in 2017. In the Senate, the bill was introduced 
by Senator Cory Booker and co-sponsored by Senator Tom Udall. In the House, it was 
introduced by Representative David Cicilline and co-sponsored by Representatives John 
Conyers Jr., and Matt Cartwright. All of these representatives other than John Conyers Jr. 
are still in office. Given that there is a distinct possibility of Democratic use of the CRA in 
the 117th Congress, it may even be possible to get Republican co-sponsors. Once passed 
by Congress, the SCRAP Act of 2021 would become effective immediately upon 
signature by the President.  
The SCRAP Act of 2021 would repeal Chapter 8 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code (i.e., the 
CRA) in its entirety. It would also make the following to changes to other statutes that 
reference the CRA:  
(1) FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT.—
Section 102(a) of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (21 
U.S.C. 387a–1(a)) is amended by striking paragraph (7). 
(2) AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004.—Section 642 of the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (7 U.S.C. 519a) is amended by striking subsection (c). 
(3) FARM SECURITY AND RURAL INVESTMENT ACT OF 2002.—Section 
1601(c) of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (7 U.S.C. 7991(c)) is 
amended by striking paragraph (3). 
                                                 
86 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, 946 F.3d 553, 562 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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(4) FOOD, CONSERVATION, AND ENERGY ACT OF 2008.—Section 1601(c) of 
the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 8781(c)) is amended— 
(A) by striking paragraph (3); and 
(B) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3). 
(5) AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 2014.—Section 1601(c) of the Agricultural Act of 
2014 (7 U.S.C. 9091(c)) is amended by striking paragraph (3). 
(6) FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985.—Section 1246 of the Food Security Act of 
1985 (16 U.S.C. 3846) is amended by striking subsection (c). 
(7) FEDERAL NONNUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 
OF 1974.—Section 12 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and 
Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5911) is amended— 
(A) by striking “(a) The President” and inserting “The President”; and 
(B) by striking subsection (b). 
(8) ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF 1965.—Section 
1601(e) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
6571(e)) is amended by striking “or chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code 
(commonly known as the ‘Congressional Review Act’).” 
(9) PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT.—Section 401(f)(4) of the Public Health 
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 281(f)(4)) is amended by striking the second sentence. 
(10) CREDIT UNION MEMBERSHIP ACCESS ACT.—Section 205 of the Credit 
Union Membership Access Act (12 U.S.C. 1759 note) is repealed. 
(11) MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003.—Section 303(i) of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (42 U.S.C. 1395u note) is 
amended— 
(A) by striking paragraph (5); and 
(B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (5). 
(12) TAX AND TRADE RELIEF EXTENSION ACT OF 1998.—Section 5101(i)(1) 
of the Tax and Trade Relief Extension Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 1395x note) is 
amended by striking “(without regard to chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code).” 
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Further, the SCRAP Act of 2021 would provide a means to reinstate disapproved 
rules. There would be an option to fast-track reinstatement wherein a federal agency 
could reinstate a rule for which a joint resolution of disapproval had been enacted under 
the CRA by publishing the covered rule within a one-year period after the enactment of 
the SCRAP Act. For rules which are not fast-tracked for reinstatement, a Federal agency 
could reinstate the rule using the traditional rulemaking procedures under the 
Administrative Procedures Act.  
II. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION TOOL 
In order to build support within the Democratic party in Congress, it will be 
valuable to highlight the other tools that are available to this administration to address 
problematic Trump Administration rules and make clear how that authority extends 
beyond the shorter timeline for application of the CRA. To build support among 
Republicans, it would be useful to make clear that a failure to support the repeal of the 
CRA leaves open the possibility of it being deployed to undo many of the Trump-era 
midnight rules. Appeals to conservative trade associations that are unhappy with 
currently proposed resolutions could bring some pressure to bear on Republican 
Senators and Representatives.  
In order to build popular support for the repeal of the CRA, the administration 
and favorable representatives should use their bully pulpits to bring to light the reckless 
and perhaps corrupt use of the CRA by the Trump Administration. Hearings should be 
held to investigate whether there is any truth to claims that corporate donations were 
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largely behind which rules were disapproved using the CRA.87 Further, a media strategy 
should be unveiled that highlights the rules that were disapproved, focusing on those 
that most Americans will strongly support such as the FCC’s internet privacy rule, the 
CFPB’s indirect auto lenders rule which protected minorities from discriminatory lending 
practices, and the Department of Interior’s Alaska predators protection rule. Polling 
could be completed to determine which of the overturned rules are the most important 
to Americans. 
Because the SCRAP Act should create a net savings for the federal government, 
this would not be an impediment. The Congressional Budget Office did not complete a 
cost estimate for the SCRAP Act of 2017. However, what is clear is that the SCRAP Act 
does not create any new bureaucracy and prevents the disapproval of regulations that 
have, on average, been completed as a result of several years of work by executive 
agencies.  
Policy Analysis  
Passage of the SCRAP Act of 2021 would have the effect of repealing the CRA 
and would thereby address the problems identified that are created by the CRA. 
However, doing so would strip Congress of the powers that the CRA provided; therefore, 
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any analysis of this policy proposal, must weigh the problems created by the CRA against 
the benefits of the CRA and the goals of the CRA.  
I. WHAT IS TO BE GAINED BY SCRAPPING THE CRA? 
In evaluating a new SCRAP Act, passage of this bill would have the desired effect, 
i.e., it would repeal the CRA which would, in turn, remove at least some of the negative 
consequences associated with the Act. Therefore, to evaluate the wisdom of passing the 
SCRAP Act and repealing the CRA, it is important to consider the problems created by 
the CRA and to understand whether they would actually be fixed.  
The goal of repealing the CRA would be to address the issues created by the law 
among them:   
• The CRA impact on the efficiency of agency rulemaking.  
• The issuance of joint resolutions of disapproval under the CRA wastes 
federal resources insofar as the rules that are vetoed are years in the 
making and require expenditure of significant resources to develop. 
• The CRA strips protection from American citizens; the rules that are at risk 
protect America’s health and environment, the U.S. economy, and support 
equal treatment of all Americans. 
• The safeguards created by the rules subject to CRA review might not be 
available post-CRA veto because the statute disallows new substantially 
similar rules. 
As a backdrop to analyzing the ways that a repeal of the CRA would impact 
rulemaking, it is important to understand the drivers of rulemaking. The need for 
regulations has been characterized as arising because “a concerned citizenry has 
demanded that Congress enact legislation to protect the public from the adverse effects 
of the activities” legitimately undertaken by individuals and corporations seeking 
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economic gains.88 And, because Congress rarely specifies in detail how the statutory 
protections are to be implemented in the real world, implementation is typically 
delegated to federal agencies that are “tasked with ‘filling up the details’ in legislation 
pursuant to the procedures specified in the legislation or in the Administrative Procedure 
Act. 89 Some would argue that currently, regulations must fill even bigger gaps – i.e., the 
regulations “try to address the problems that confront the country” but finding the 
statutory frameworks lacking, they act “through creative readings of statutory authority, 
to identify sources of power to deal with” these serious problems.90 
A. REPEAL OF THE CRA WOULD FACILITATE MORE EFFICIENT AND APPROPRIATE AGENCY 
RULEMAKING 
1) The CRA may slow down the rulemaking process overall. 
One of the goals of repealing the CRA is to facilitate the smooth development 
and implementation of regulations by executive agencies. In terms of the impact on the 
efficiency in rulemaking, the CRA has a built-in delay mechanism: a minimum of a sixty-
day delay is associated with Congressional review that is part and parcel of the CRA.91 
Further, the CRA may slow down the process as agencies need to pad their analyses to 
insulate rules from congressional review.  
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2012. 
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The CRA can be thought of as one of many efforts at “regulatory reform” that 
Congress has established in order to “rein in” the administrative state. This effort began 
with the passage of the Administrative Procedures Act in 1946.92 Since the CRA had not 
been used extensively until 2017, and the agencies were functioning under the same 
administration that deployed the CRA until January 2021, the implications of the use of 
the CRA have not yet been empirically studied. Therefore, it is helpful to look at the 
analysis of the impacts of other regulatory reform measures.  
Some argue that the impact of regulatory reform has made rulemaking “‘costly, 
rigid, and cumbersome’ and afflicted by ‘perverse incentives that conspire to undermine 
sound public policy.”93 This situation has been described by some as resulting in 
“ossification” of the rulemaking process but other scholars marshal evidence to claim this 
is not the case. Studies on the impact of judicial review have found that about half of the 
rules that are evaluated by the courts are remanded at least in part.94 A more recent 
study considering the impact of increased public participation in the form of comments 
found that in the case of “complex” rules, more participation meant slower finalization of 
rules.95  
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Researchers Jason and Susan Webb Yackee argue that ossification is not a 
significant issue and have concluded that the system is not fundamentally broken 
despite accepting the assertion that in recent years, things do take longer.96 Nonetheless, 
they conclude that “evidence that ossification is either a serious or widespread problem 
is mixed and relatively weak.”97 They claim that agencies appear to be able and willing to 
issue substantial numbers of regulations relatively quickly. They argue that there are 
more challenges associated with intra-agency red tape.98 They draw no normative 
conclusion about the delays in terms of whether the delays result in improvements in the 
substance of the rules but only find that rules do appear to keep coming.  
It is worth noting, however, that one of the very few examples the Yackees 
provide of a “socially worthwhile regulation” that was thwarted is OSHA’s ergonomics 
rule which was overturned pursuant to the CRA. In fact, the authors imply that the only 
successful use of the CRA at the time of their study may correctly be construed as 
ossification.99  
There is no decisive conclusion that can be drawn from the research on 
regulatory reform and applied to the CRA but there does seem to be consensus that as 
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regulatory oversight has increased, so has the time it takes to issue rules. Further, the 
research holds open the possibility that the CRA creates ossification.  
2) The CRA may impact the quality of rules developed as agencies race against 
the clock. 
One of the goals in repealing the CRA is to allow agencies to do the work of 
rulemaking without thinking about the speed of completing the task in time to insulate 
the rule from CRA review. 100 Agencies may deem the risk of CRA review high enough 
that they will rush to avoid the CRA’s lookback period. Were agencies to rush through 
the process, they might not do a thorough enough job on the background research. As 
one scholar framed it, although final regulations rushed by agencies “might get to bed 
earlier, there is no guarantee that they will wake up looking better.”101 Some studies 
suggest that the quality of economic analyses may suffer if an agency is acting on a tight 
deadline.102   
The risk of CRA nullification may drive agencies to opt out of contentious 
rulemakings.103 “[F]acing a bigger threat of rollbacks might also cause agencies to be less 
likely to be ambitious or take policy risks, especially with rules they issue later in the 
presidential term.” In the case of the Methane Waste Prevention rule, CRA disapproval 
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may hinge on just a few Senators so if the rule can be dulled just enough, it may not be 
overturned.   
B. REPEAL OF THE CRA WOULD AVOID WASTED EFFORTS OF AGENCIES AND WASTED EXPENSE 
ASSOCIATED WITH PURSUING RULES THAT ARE ULTIMATELY VETOED 
When considering the cost of developing rules, the best indicator of the 
resources expended is the time invested by the agencies in developing the rules. In 
looking at the sixteen rules that were disapproved in 2016 and 2017, the average 
rulemaking took three years.104 Two of the rules took over seven years to complete.105 
Some research indicates that the average time to complete a rule is five years and that 
particularly complicated or controversial rules take five to ten years to complete.106 
Comparatively, the provisions of the CRA allow for a fast-tracked disapproval with limited 
time for committees review, disallowance of filibusters and limited floor debate of a 
resolution in the Senate to ten hours.107  
Even before a rule is published, agencies invest significant time and resources. 
Prior to the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking, agencies spend several years 
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identifying the need for a rule, gathering stakeholder input, and collecting data. The 
General Accountability Office (GAO) said that “during an ‘initiation phase, agencies 
gather information to determine whether to issue the rule, identify needed resources, 
and may draft concept documents for management.”108 The initial steps of the agency 
rulemaking process are shown clearly in Figure 2.109 
Figure 2. Basic Phases of Rulemaking Process 
 
During the second phase, the development of a rule is a coordinated effort, with 
economists, lawyers, policy and subject matter experts contributing to individual 
rulemakings. Also built into this phase are opportunities for internal and external 
deliberations.110 
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Integrated with the internal agency process are reviews from OMB and within the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). And, after the agency and OMB have 
completed their efforts, then there are Congressional and Judicial review as shown in 
Figure 2 below.111 What this figure does not show, however, are the loops. For instance, a 
judicial decision can restart the process, sending the rule back to the agency to correct 
any infirmities.112  
While hard data is not available regarding the number of work-hours committed 
per rulemaking or money expended with outside contractors on data collection and 
analysis, it is clear that the amount of work that executive agencies commit to develop 
rules is significant as are the costs associated with the process. 
  
                                                 
111 Copeland. “The Unified Agenda: Implications for Rulemaking Transparency and Participation,” at 3. 
112 See e.g., API v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 8 (2013). (SEC anti-corruption rule was vacated by the D.C. District 
Court in 2013). 
36 
 
Figure 3. Detailed Overview of Steps Leading to a Rule 
 
When viewed against the 
arduous, time-consuming 
and expensive process 
associated with 
rulemaking, the dearth of 
deliberation associated 
with joint resolutions 
under the CRA showcase 
the issue of continuing 
the current practice. Put 
simply, the CRA’s 
provisions discourage 
meaningful deliberation. 
“With respect to the 
Senate, the CRA prohibits 
consideration of  
amendments and most other motions while capping floor debate at just 10 hours, split 
evenly between those in favor and against the resolution.”113 Not only are the hours of 
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debate limited, during the 115th Congress the supporters of joint resolutions of 
disapproval ceded most if not all of their five-hour allotments during floor debate.114 
This analysis shows that when the CRA is used to effectively veto a regulation, 
years of work is essentially jettisoned, and it is done so with very little deliberation or 
analysis. As the Obama and Trump administrations demonstrated, there are other ways 
to get rid of problematic rules. They are certainty more cumbersome, but they involve 
the considered judgment of the agencies repealing and replacing rules, or of Congress 
through appropriations or legislative changes.115  
C. REPEAL OF THE CRA WOULD ENSURE THAT AGENCIES CONTINUE TO PROTECT AMERICANS’ 
HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT AND PROMOTE EQUITABLE TREATMENT THROUGH RULEMAKING 
In considering whether the passage of the SCRAP Act of 2021 and a repeal of the 
CRA would ensure protection, it is instructive to understand the history of joint 
resolutions of disapproval that have passed and been enacted since the CRA became 
law. Four inter-party transitions have occurred since the passage of the CRA: from Bill 
Clinton to George W. Bush in 2001, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama in 2009, from 
Barack Obama to Donald Trump in 2017, and from Donald Trump to Joe Biden in 2021. 
In that time, prior to 2017, a rule was only rescinded once, by George W. Bush in 2001. 
When Obama took office, thirty-two rules were deemed eligible for disapproval, but 
Obama opted not to use the CRA; rather, his administration used regular rulemaking 
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procedures to overturn targeted rules.116 Under Trump, on the other hand, the CRA was 
used to strike sixteen rules. When comparing Trump with George W. Bush and Obama, 
some scholars have pointed out that Bush and Obama were comfortable “using the 
administrative state to advance [their] policy goals.”117 
As shown above in the Statement of the Problem section of this memorandum, 
the CRA has only been used to strike protective rules. These were rules that were 
designed to “protect consumers, investors, workers, low-income women, students, the 
environment, and potential victims of gun violence.”118 This empirical evidence shows 
that the CRA has been deployed to take away safeguards and to make American society 
less equitable. It is the tool of anti-regulatory Presidents, or Presidents who do not see 
administrative rulemaking as a desirable means to get things done, as Paul Larkin, a 
Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, would argue.119    
The hesitancy to apply the CRA by Presidents who see the value of agency 
rulemaking is tied to the prohibition on agencies issuing a new rule that is “substantially 
the same” as the one vetoed under the CRA.120 The Obama Administration could have 
used the CRA to roll-back Bush midnight rules which were anathema to Democrats in the 
111th Congress including rules that decreased protection of endangered species, allowed 
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development of oil shale on some federal lands, and opened up oil drilling in the Utah 
wilderness as well as a conscientious objector regulation that allowed certain healthcare 
providers to refuse to administer abortions or dispense contraception.121 It was this same 
concern that drove Senator John McCain and other Republican Senators to break ranks 
with their party on the proposed veto of the Methane Waste Prevention Rule. BLM’s rule 
was intended to reduce emissions of methane to the environment through venting, 
flaring, and leaks. McCain said, “[w]hile I am concerned that the BLM rule may be 
onerous, passage of the resolution would have prevented the federal government, under 
any administration, from issuing a rule that is ‘similar,’ according to the plain reading of 
the Congressional Review Act.”122 This might have made it impossible to regulate 
methane emissions, which McCain believed could impact public health.  
The extent of this prohibition on substantially similar rules has not been tested. 
But it is possible that in the not-too-distant future, the strength of this prohibition will 
become clear. The significant number of CRA disapprovals during the Trump era and the 
fact that the current administration has different policy priorities, may mean that we will 
see a test of this rule. As scholars have pointed out, “since there has never yet been an 
attempt by an agency to reissue a rule following a CRA veto, there remains ambiguity 
not only over what kinds of rules are barred, but how any such restrictions would be 
enforced.”123 If the current administration were to issue new regulations to replace those 
vetoed under the CRA during the Trump Administration, any party aggrieved by the 
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replacement regulation could initiate an Administrative Procedures Act challenge 
arguing that the agency lacked the authority to issue the regulation because it is 
“substantially the same” as one that was vetoed.124  
In sum, it is clear that getting rid of the CRA would have the effect of protecting 
Americans’ health and environment, protecting low-income workers, providing 
protection against large corporations, and make America a more equitable nation.  
D. WHAT WILL BE LOST IF THE CRA IS REPEALED? 
While there appear to be benefits to repealing the CRA in terms of avoiding 
economic waste, allowing for more flexibility and efficiency in the rulemaking process, 
and supporting the development of protective regulations, this must be balanced 
against what will be lost if the CRA is repealed. To understand what is at risk it is helpful 
to look to the legislative intent of, and the rationale that supported passage of, the CRA. 
While there is no legislative history that we can turn to, the co-sponsors of the CRA 
issued a post-enactment joint statement laying out legislative intent.125  
 
1) Repeal of the CRA would shrink Congressional Oversight Options and 
Remove Congress’s “Cleanest” Mechanism for Recission of a Rule 
Congress hoped that the CRA would rebalance the roles of the legislative and 
executive branches of government. It was anticipated that the CRA would “help to 
redress the balancing, reclaiming for Congress some of its policymaking authority, 
without at the same time requiring Congress to become a super regulatory agency.”126 
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The CRA was a recognition that “Congress has come to depend more and more upon 
Executive Branch agencies to fill out the details of programs it enacts” and a response to 
the claims “that Congress has effectively abdicated its role as the national legislature in 
allowing federal agencies so much latitude in implementing and interpreting 
congressional enactments.”127 
The impulse behind the CRA has existed for the better part of the last century. 
The legislative veto was developed in response to the expanding government resulting 
from The Great Depression. “As early as the 1930s, members of Congress worried that 
wide delegations of administrative authority would leave the unelected bureaucracy 
politically unaccountable.”128 Legislative vetoes were initially built into other statutes 
rather than a stand-alone statute like the CRA. Initially, they were common in 
governmental reorganization statutes but by the 1940s, legislative vetoes were applied in 
national security and foreign affairs laws as well. During the 1950s, the number of 
statutes affected by legislative vetoes continued to grow. In the 1960s and 1970s, public 
trust in executive agencies waned concomitant with the federal government becoming 
more actively involved in the economy in an effort to pursue social and economic goals. 
During this era, Congress dramatically increased the use of legislative vetoes.129 All of 
this changed with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 1983, when the Court found the 
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unicameral veto that was in place to be unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha.130 The CRA 
was an effort to recapture the capacities that were taken away in that case.  
In sum, if the CRA is repealed Congress will have one less arrow in its quiver with 
which to oversee and manage the executive agencies. While this is certainly the case, 
there are those who would argue that legislative vetoes and the CRA have generally not 
been effective at achieving these Congressional goals and that there are other means 
available to address the desire to keep the bureaucracy in check. 
When looking at the usefulness of legislative vetoes prior to 2017, scholars found 
that the legislative veto was rarely used and was of limited effectiveness. It was thought 
that the “legislative veto had great political value to members of Congress intent on 
demonstrating to constituents that they were overseeing another otherwise unchecked 
federal bureaucracy.”131 The same assertion is made about the CRA – that it may have 
been more about signaling to constituents and agencies Congress’s intent to police the 
bureaucracy.132 While all of this may have been true prior to 2017, nobody can doubt 
that the 115th wielded the CRA as a powerful tool to “rein in the bureaucracy.” 
While there may be other means to manage bureaucracy, it is clear that the CRA 
provided a more streamlined method to rescind a rule and provided Congress additional 
time to act before the rule entered into effect. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, 
all final rules had to be published at least thirty days before their effective date, during 
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which time Congress could use the ordinary legislative process to overturn any 
regulation before it goes into effect.133 As the CRA co-sponsors wrote: “The reason for 
the delay in the effectiveness of a major rule beyond that provided in the APA subsection 
553(d) is to try to provide Congress with an opportunity to act on resolutions of 
disapproval before the regulated community must invest significant resources necessary 
to comply with a major rule.”134  
While the CRA created a streamlined tool for Congressional oversight, it did not 
endow Congress with new powers per se. “Congress [could] already enact legislation to 
prevent any and all regulations from becoming law.”135 In addition to the ability to 
overturning undesirable rules through the ordinary legislative process, Congress 
establishes the substantive content of agency authority, creates informational, 
budgetary, and other controls to which it will the agency is subject, and “maintains a 
formidable omnipresence through its oversight, appropriations and confirmation 
processes.”136 
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2) Repeal of the CRA would Prevent the 117th Congress from Vetoing Numerous 
Trump-Era Midnight Rules 
Given the present moment, and the fact that Congress has begun proposing CRA 
resolutions of disapproval, another very relevant negative is that the 117th Congress 
would be unable to take action on numerous Trump midnight rules. The Congressional 
Research Service has unofficially estimated that final rules submitted to the House or 
Senate after August 21, 2020, until the end of the 116th Congress on January 3, 2021, are 
subject to the CRA lookback provisions.137 There are by some accounts over 1,400 rules 
that were made in the waning months of the Trump Administration that are eligible for 
review under the CRA.138 Some argue that the practical constraints of the Congressional 
calendar likely mean that it could only be used around a dozen or two dozen times 
before those expedited procedures expire.”139 Also, given the 2019 OMB memorandum, 
it will take away Congress’s ability to reach further back in time to overturn long-
standing guidance.140  
Many of the Trump Administration’s midnight rules were anti-regulatory and are 
perceived by Democrats in the 117th Congress as putting the environment, labor, and 
other Democratic values at risk. Keeping the CRA would allow the 117th Congress to 
summarily veto some of these Trump-era rules. Of course, this enticement must be 
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measured against the risk that Senator McCain identified with regard to the Waste 
Reduction Rule – issuing a joint resolution of disapproval may make it problematic for 
agencies to issue more “desirable” rules in the future on the same subject matter. 
Political Analysis  
Passage of the SCRAP Act of 2021 would be a heavy lift. There are many in the 
Republican Party who are are committed to “regulatory reform” and persuading them 
that the CRA is a bad tool, would be difficult. That being said, even some whose general 
impulse is toward regulatory reform recognize some the CRA’s shortcomings. Further, 
interest groups who supported the CRA when it was used to get rid of protective 
regulations are not happy with the prospect of it being used to undo Trump-era rules. 
This shows that their support for the CRA may be tied to certain applications more than 
the statute itself. Therefore, it may be possible to gain support among interest groups to 
repeal the CRA before it can be unleashed to undo the rules developed late in the Trump 
Administration. And, while the public “love[s] to hate bureaucracy, the reality is that 
executive agencies have a significantly higher approval rating than Congress.”141 
I. STAKEHOLDER POSITIONING ON THE CRA? 
Many trade associations supported the CRA when it was being used by the 115th 
Congress to rescind Obama-era regulations. Sometimes that support extended to the 
CRA writ large but oftentimes the support was tied more closely to a specific proposed 
resolution of disapproval. Among those that supported specific applications of the CRA 
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were associations including the American Chemistry Council, National Mining 
Association, National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Petroleum 
Institute.142 However, some trade association went further to support expansions of the 
CRA which would have allowed either more liberal application of the CRA to older 
executive orders and guidance documents or bundling of the multiple rules in a single 
CRA regulation.143 
Tellingly, however, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association 
of Manufacturers which are well known to be very conservative are now opposing the 
use of the CRA by the 117th Congress.144 Several CRA joint resolutions of disapproval 
have now been introduced. The Chamber and NAM have spoken out against a proposed 
resolution which would undo a Securities and Exchange Commission rule which investors 
say curbs their power to push for corporate action on issues like climate change and 
compensation.145 
                                                 
142 Jeff Johnson. “Congress considers revoking chemical safety rule: Chemical makers asked for overturn of 
EPA regulation.” C&EN (95) (February 6, 2017), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/cen-09506-notw12; 
National Mining Association, December 19, 2016, “NMA strongly opposes EPA’s duplicative stream rule.” 
https://nma.org/2016/12/19/nma-strongly-opposes-interior-departments-duplicative-stream-rule/;  National 
Association of Manufacturers, “Let your Representative know that manufacturers need Washington to 
address the regulatory burden we face in order to accelerate economic growth.” 
https://manufacturingworks.nam.org/bFKmtEd; American Petroleum Institute, “Support the Congressional 
Review Act Disapproval Resolution for the Dodd-Frank Section 1504 Rule.” https://www.api.org/-
/media/Files/News/Letters-Comments/2017/2-1-29-17_API-CRA_Dodd-Frank_1504.pdf 
143 National Association of Home Builders, January 6, 2017. “House Passes Regulatory Reform Bills.” 
https://nahbnow.com/2017/01/house-passes-regulatory-reform-bills/; Neil Bradley, May 11, 2017. “After the 
Successful Use of the Congressional Review Act, Here’s Where Regulatory Reform Goes 
Next.”https://www.uschamber.com/series/above-the-fold/after-the-successful-use-the-congressional-
review-act-here-s-where-regulatory. 
144 Katanga Johnson. “U.S. Senate Democrats aim to undo Trump-era shareholder voting rights rule.” 
Reuters, March 26. 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-senate-proxy/u-s-senate-democrats-aim-
to-undo-trump-era-shareholder-voting-rights-rule-idUSKBN2BI2BS?il=0  




Furthermore, even some writing on behalf of the CATO Institute finds that the 
CRA is not the best tool to review regulations. In 2020, the CATO Institute put out a 
Policy Analysis stating that the CRA “deprives lawmakers of an informed choice. At 
present, members deliberating on a legislative veto are limited to information from 
biased sources—either the president behind the rule or special interests aligned on one 
side or the other of a given regulatory policy.”146 The analysis stated that the flurry of 
legislative vetoes in the 115th Congress demonstrated the inadequacy of the current 
process. CATO pointed out that: “No committee held a hearing, much less a vote, on any 
of the measures, nor did any committee issue any reports. For each of the legislative 
vetoes, Congress failed to perform any investigation or analysis.” This objection to the 
CRA is remarkably on point with the position of the Center for Progressive Reform that 
the CRA is problematic because it eliminates deliberation.147 
In a blog post, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) recognized that Congress 
has the authority to undo any regulation even without the CRA.148 CEI questioned the 
legitimacy of the CRA’s acting as a permanent rules change in contravention of the 
Senate’s filibuster rule. This was argued to be problematic because the Constitution gives 
each House the authority to set its rules as it sees fit.149  
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Among environmental non-governmental organizations and left-leaning think 
tanks, there has similarly been opposition to specific applications of the CRA150 but also 
broad condemnation of the law and calls for its repeal. Among those groups who have 
taken the broadest stance against the CRA, the two most vocal opponents are Public 
Citizen and the Center for Progressive Reform. Public Citizen has highlighted that the 
CRA was used in 2017 to reverse protective rulemakings and that those reversals could 
be tied to over $1 billion in political contributions. Public Citizen stated that the outcome 
is that “corporate predators, polluters and profiteers who would have been reined in by 
these rules are now free to abuse, exploit and discriminate against regular Americans, 
knowing they won’t be held accountable.”151 Additionally, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council has characterized the CRA as “a blunt instrument with dangerous repercussions” 
which makes it possible for Congress to “block public safeguards on behalf of special 
interests, undoing rules that often reflect years of painstaking, technical work to deal 
with complex problems . . . .”152 
II. PUBLIC VIEWS ON THE CRA AND THE NEED FOR REGULATORY REFORM 
In trying to understand where the public stands on the CRA, it is helpful to look 
to the public’s perception of administrative agencies or “the bureaucracy” as a proxy 
because no surveys have been completed specifically addressing the CRA. While some 
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surveys evaluate Americans’ trust in government overall and Congress in particular, there 
are not many surveys specifically evaluating Americans’ trust in administrative 
agencies.153  
However, a study that was released in January of 2021, synthesized various 
studies and determined that Americans approve of bureaucratic institutions at a much 
higher level than they do of Congress, and at a higher level than they express trust in 
government overall.154 This finding is consistent with the results of a 2005 study wherein 
the researchers evaluated public approval for the bureaucracy at a macro-level, as 
opposed to their approval for individual agencies.155 
Figure 4. Public Trust in Government 
 
Another recent study on this topic 
concluded that “Americans appear 
poised to defer to bureaucrats on 
questions of policy implementation 
when those bureaucrats are 
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perceived as experts.”156 The 
researcher concluded that it 
behooves those who support agency 
action to focus on agency expertise. 
Interestingly, this is consistent with  
the New Deal rationale for the expansion of the bureaucracy and the Supreme Court’s 
rationale for granting deference to the administrative state.157  
The idea that Americans hate the administrative state is a very popular media 
trope but may be untethered to reality.158 Based on their research, Yackee and Lowery 
conclude: “we know now that public opinion regarding the federal bureaucracy is not 
nearly as low as may be inferred from the negative assessments of some politicians and 
political pundits.”159 
In the absence of an estimate of approval for the CRA, public trust in the agencies 
that are hamstrung by the CRA is a good proxy. To the extent that the public approves of 
the agencies more than they approve of Congress, it seems feasible that the public 
                                                 
156 Rogowski “The Administrative Presidency and Public Trust in Bureaucracy,” at 25. 
157 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, at 2417. Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, provides an extended 
discussion of why agencies should be granted deference including that they have “unique expertise,” that 
they “can conduct factual investigations, . . . consult with affected parties,  . . . consider how their experts 
have handled similar cases . . .”  
158 See e.g., Philip Wallach, “The administrative state’s legitimacy crisis”; John Tierney, The Tyranny of the 
Administrative State, Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-tyranny-of-the-
administrative-state-1497037492 ; The Editorial Board, “Administrative State Under Judicial Fire,” Wall Street 
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11568929932; Robert Samuelson, “The administrative state is huge, and its only getting bigger,” Washington 
Post. March 5, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-administrative-state-is-huge-and-its-
only-getting-bigger/2017/03/05/bb388e28-003a-11e7-99b4-9e613afeb09f_story.html.  
159 Yackee and Lowery, “Understanding Public Support for the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy,” at 530.  
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would look favorably upon revoking a law which hands more power to Congress to undo 
the work of the bureaucracy.     
III. POLITICAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PURSUING THE SCRAP ACT OF 2021 
Pursuing the SCRAP Act will have associated political benefits and costs. It will 
serve to further align the administration with those entities who believe a fully functional 
administrative state will provide critical protection to Americans. It will also serve to 
provide unity within the Democratic party, paving the way for agencies to take what is 
perceived as critical action on issues such as climate change, immigration, and other 
issues.   
However, pursuing the SCRAP Act of 2021 will provide a basis for those who 
supported expansion of the CRA to move further away from the Biden agenda.160 This 
group is comprised almost exclusively of Republicans (plus one Democrat who lost his 
seat in the 2020 election), and given that to date, no Republicans have voted with the 
Biden Administration on any substantive matter, perhaps this political risk is small. 
Therefore, alienating this group may not be of significant political consequence.  
The greater political risk seems to be from within the Democratic Party. While 
immediately after the election and prior to President Biden’s inauguration, there was 
much hand-wringing over the fragile Democratic coalition, so far, that coalition is 
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holding together.161 But, the focus to date has been addressing the economic and 
pandemic crises facing the country. There is recognition that “the moment of unity could 
be fragile: Sharp differences remain between Mr. Biden and his left flank over issues like 
health care, college costs, expanding the Supreme Court and tackling income equality. A 
battle looms over whether to prioritize a $15 per hour minimum wage in the 
administration’s first piece of legislation.”162 
And, more to the issue at hand, should this administration pursue the SCRAP Act, 
it would do so despite the fact that at present, several resolutions have been introduced 
under the CRA to dismantle Trump-era rules and more are planned.163 Further, one of 
these resolutions has over twenty-five Democratic co-sponsors in the House.164 
Additionally, more CRA joint resolutions of disapproval are being planned.165 One means 
to address this political risk would be to wait to seek reintroduction of the SCRAP Act 
until after the CRA lookback period has run. However, the flip side of this tactic would be 
                                                 
161 Lisa Lerer and Reid J. Epstein, “How Biden United a Fractious Party Under One Tent,” New York Times. 
(March 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/09/us/politics/joe-biden-democratic-party.html  
162 Ibid.  
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164 H.J.Res.34 - Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of a 
rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to "Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission 
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that any support that could be sought from the Chamber or the National Association of 
Manufacturers will be gone at the same moment.  
IV. POLITICAL STRATEGIES TO EMPLOY IN PURSUIT OF THE SCRAP ACT OF 2021 
Given that the Democratic coalition is strong at present and is likely to remain so 
for the next several months, it seems prudent to pursue the SCRAP Act of 2021 right 
away in order to take advantage of any possible willingness on the part of entities such 
as the US Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to help 
push some willing Republicans to support the SCRAP Act. It would be necessary to get a 
handful of Republicans on board to pass this bill in the Senate. Furthermore, the 
administration should highlight the expertise in agencies and public support for those 
agencies and leverage that support for agencies over Congress to help form a coalition 
of willing Republicans to join Democrats in support of the SCRAP Act of 2021.  
Recommendation  
In light of the above analysis, I strongly recommend pursuing the SCRAP Act of 
2021. While there is a possibility that it will not pass the Senate, the political downside 
risks associated with pursuing the bill are not sufficient to override the potential policy 
benefits of passage of the bill.  
Pursuing the SCRAP Act of 2021 has two potential political risks. The first political 
risk comes from the Biden Administration’s political right. Seeking to repeal the CRA will 
likely further alienate Republicans who sought to make the CRA stronger and who 
strongly favor Congressional oversight of administrative agencies. These same 
Republicans could paint a picture of Biden and Congressional Democrats who support 
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the SCRAP Act as allowing “the administrative state” to run roughshod over business, the 
American people, and Congress.166 This is one more reason to act quickly. If the effort 
takes place in 2021, it is less likely to be used to attack Congressional Democrats running 
for reelection in 2022.  
The other political risk comes from the Administration’s left within the 
Democratic Party. While the Democratic Party has attained some level of coherence at 
present, it is recognized that there are many areas of disagreement on issues such as 
health care, college costs, the number of Justices that should sit on the Supreme Court, 
income equality, and the minimum wage. Given this background and the fact that there 
are numerous proposed resolutions of disapproval that have been tabled by Democrats, 
taking action to dismantle the CRA could disturb the current fragile peace that exists 
within the Democratic Party. However, most Democrats will realize that the CRA is an 
anti-safeguard and anti-regulatory law which has been wielded effectively to dismantle 
protective rules.  
Despite these political risks associated with seeking passage of the SCRAP Act, 
the policy imperatives associated with repealing the CRA make pursuing the SCRAP Act 
the best course of action. First, the CRA is an anti-safeguard law – in looking at every rule 
which has been vetoed under the CRA to date, each has protections such as internet 
privacy, gun control, biodiversity, water quality, women’s health, workplace safety, fair 
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pay measures, and retirement security. The CRA is a tool which has only been used by 
Presidents with an anti-regulatory and anti-safeguard agenda.  
Second, repealing the CRA will make it more straightforward for agencies to act. 
This is important given the absence of critical legislation to address the most pressing 
issues of the day. Hyper-partisan gridlock in Washington has created a situation where 
Congress has utterly failed to legislate on the most challenging issues. Even in cases 
where Congress has legislated, it has left significant gaps for agencies to interpret and 
implement. By making it more difficult for agencies to act with certainty, the CRA has 
made it just that much more challenging to have any action on pressing issues of the 
day.  
Third, the CRA creates obstacles to agencies being able to act efficiently. It slows 
down the process of notice-and-comment rulemaking and sets the stage for agencies to 
spend years working on a rule only to have all of that work jettisoned. Agencies may 
make judgements that in order to avoid falling within the CRA lookback period, that they 
should rush through the process which can result in poorly researched and designed 
regulations.  
Fourth, the fact that CRA, by design, limits deliberation and that resolutions of 
disapproval occur with little to no deliberation creates an appearance of impropriety. 
This structural problem has been recognized by commentators on both the political left 
and right. This very rapid decision-making to rescind a regulation that may have been in 
the works for years erodes the public’s trust in government. The argument that the use 
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of the CRA to veto certain rules amounts to nothing more than a political decision that 
may be driven by contributions harms our government’s institutional credibility.  
Fifth, the expansive interpretation of the CRA in the OMB 2019 memorandum 
creates significant uncertainties. It has been argued by some conservative scholars, that 
OMB’s memorandum may mean that any and all guidance documents created since 
1996 which were not submitted to Congress may all be invalid. In the last twenty-five 
years, industry has taken these guidance documents as de facto law and has acted in 
accordance with them. While there is certainly room to argue that this is not the ideal 
way to make law, OMB’s interpretation of the CRA has the potential to cost companies 
that installed additional controls or changed practices in order to comply very significant 
sums of money. It creates an incentive for noncompliance. These are not objectives that 
Congress should want to encourage.  
Finally, the CRA’s limitation on substantially similar rules creates real issues in 
terms of the ability to develop new regulations that cover the same subject matters as 
regulations that have previously been vetoed through the use of the CRA. The 
substantially similar provision may mean that because Congress refuses to act and the 
agencies are unable to act, that there is no recourse to address pressing issues.  
By repealing the CRA, all of these problems that are created by its application 
would go away. And, repealing the CRA would not make it impossible for future 
Congresses and administrations to get rid of existing regulations that they deem 
inappropriate. Congress can change the law and it has the power of the purse. Further 
executive agencies can unwind existing rules under the standard APA process.   
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In sum, while there are political risks associated with repealing the CRA, and while 
it is possible that the Administration will not be able to muster the votes to pass the 
SCRAP Act, the possibility of removing the CRA from the arsenal of anti-safeguard 
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